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INTRODUCTION

Although fourth amendment law recognizes separate and distinct justifications for automobile searches, it is abundantly clear
that each automobile search situation is factually unique. In order
to illuminate the various legal issues raised by automobile stops
and searches, this Article will review relevant decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, the Illinois Supreme Court, and the
Illinois appellate courts. As the reader will discover, the Illinois
courts generally react to the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court
and rarely advance independent analyses or original legal theories
in this area of the law.
* Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois. This Article
is based upon material prepared for the Spring 1987 session of the Illinois Judicial
Conference.
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THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT AND
PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE

A search conducted without a search warrant is presumed to be
unreasonable under the fourth amendment.I This rule applies also
to automobile searches. 2 There are, however, numerous exceptions
to the warrant requirement. Further, a search warrant, drafted to
designate specifically what area may be searched ard which items
may be seized, nevertheless may operate to grant the police extended authority to seize additional contraband or evidence of
other criminality discovered in plain view. This grant of authority
is known as the plain view doctrine. The extended authority of
the plain view doctrine may be exercised by a police officer who

lawfully searches an automobile pursuant to one or more exceptions to the search warrant requirement or during a lawful stop of
the automobile. The plain view doctrine is subject to three conditions. First, the officer must make the initial intrusion lawfully.4
Second, the discovery of the evidence must have been inadvertent. 5
Finally, the police must have had probable cause to believe that the
item was contraband or evidence of criminality.6
III.

THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION BASED
ON PROBABLE CAUSE

The United States Supreme Court held in Carroll v. United
States7 that police officers may stop a vehicle and search it if they
have probable cause to believe that the automobile contains contraband of any kind or the fruits or instrumentalities of a crime.8 The
right to search does not depend on the right to arrest. Probable
cause must be based on objective facts that would justify the issuance of a search warrant and not merely on the subjective good
faith of the police officers. 9 Probable cause may be established by
1. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides as follows:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, .. ." U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
2. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971).
3. Id. at 465 (stating that it "is well established that under certain circumstances
police may seize evidence in plain view without a warrant").
4. Id. at 465-68.
5.

Id.

6. Id. at 466. See also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (noting that this
final requirement must be viewed in the context of the field of law enforcement, not in the
field of academia).
7. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
8. Id. at 154.

9.

United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 808 (1982); Carroll,267 U.S. at 161-62.
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independent police investigation or by a reliable informant's tip.'"
Probable cause to search may also develop during a lawful stop of
an automobile. The Supreme Court held in United States v. Ross I"
that if the automobile is lawfully stopped, the police may search
every part of the vehicle and any container that may conceal the
object of their search.' 2 The scope of the search is not defined by

the nature of the container in which the contraband is secreted, but
by the object of the search and those places in which it is reasonable to believe that the object may be found.' 3 Police officers may
inspect open containers and may open and inspect closed or locked
4
containers, including the auto trunk.'

If the purpose of the search is to seize a particular container
based on probable cause that the container itself contains contra-

band, the police may stop and search the vehicle for the container
without a search warrant, remove the container from the vehicle,
and detain the container temporarily. 5 Police officers must, however, obtain a search warrant prior to inspecting the contents of the
container.16 An open question is whether the automobile exception

applies to parked vehicles.'" The automobile exception allows police officers to search the vehicle immediately on the road or subsequently at the police station, garage, or lot.'s A station search may
be delayed for a reasonable period of time.' 9 What is a reasonable

period of time is a factual question in each case.
Illinois cases generally follow Ross. In People v. Clark,20 a police

officer stopped the defendant's car after observing that it was operating with one taillight and that it was swerving from lane to
lane. 2' The officer looked into the car and saw cannabis on the car
10. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 241-46 (1983).
11. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
12. Id. at 821-24.
13. Id. at 824.
14. Id. at 817-24.
15. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761-65 (1979).
16. Id. at 761. See also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977); Oklahoma
v. Castleberry, 471 U.S. 146 (1985), aff'g Castleberry v. State, 678 P.2d 720 (Okla. Cir.
1984).
17. See, e.g., Ross, 456 U.S. at 828 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (suggesting that it is not
applicable). See also California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985) (holding that under the
automobile exception a mobile home traveling on the highway or found stationary in a
place not regularly used for residential purposes and readily capable of travel, may be
searched without a search warrant).
18. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
19. United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985).
20. 92 11. 2d 96, 440 N.E.2d 869 (1982).
21. Id. at 97-98, 440 N.E.2d at 870.
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floor.22 The officer searched inside the vehicle and found cannabis
in an open cigarette box.23 The officer then took the keys from the
ignition, opened the locked glove compartment, and found three
bags of cannabis. 24 The Illinois Supreme Court held that the
search was justified by the officer's reasonable belief that the car
contained cannabis. 25 The court reasoned that there was no indication that the stop was a pretext to search or that the officer stopped
the car for any reason other than for a traffic violation.26 The court
concluded that once the car was stopped, the officer developed
probable cause that it contained contraband.
In People v. Stout, 28 a police officer stopped the defendant after

observinfr him make an illegal right turn. 29 As the officer approached ttie car he smelled burned marijuana emanating from the
passenger compartment. 3 The subsequent search of the auto produced a vial of cocaine and codeine capsules. 3' The Illinois
Supreme Court upheld the search under the automobile exception,
because the smell gave the officer probable cause to search.32 The
Illinois Supreme Court held that "additional corroboration is not
required where a trained and experienced police officer detects
the
,33
vehicle."
defendant's
a
from
emanating
odor of cannabis
22.

Id. at 98, 440 N.E.2d at 870.

23. Id. at 98, 440 N.E.2d at 871.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 101, 440 N.E.2d at 872.
26. Id. at 100, 440 N.E.2d at 872.
27. Id. at 101-02, 440 N.E.2d at 872 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824).
28. 106 111. 2d 77, 477 N.E.2d 498 (1985).
29. Id. at 81, 477 N.E.2d at 499.
30. Id. at 81, 477 N.E. 2d at 500.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 87-88, 477 N.E. 2d at 502-03.
33. Id. at 88, 477 N.E.2d at 503. In his dissent, Justice Simon noted that the majority's failure to require any corroboration was an abuse of the probable cause requirement.
He stated as follows:
[The fourth] amendment protects citizens "against unreasonable searches and
seizures." One form of protection against unreasonable intrusions is the warrant which can only be issued upon a finding of probable cause by a neutral and
detached magistrate. Many situations, though, do not permit the time required
for preintrusion scrutiny involved in obtaining a warrant. The warrantless
search, conducted without this protection, must still meet the probable cause
requirement when accompanied by some exigent circumstance which justifies
forgoing the warrant.
The majority's holding abuses the probable-cause requirement because it does
not require any corroboration of the officer's sense of smell, a completely subjective ground for probable cause. While an officer trained in odor detection may
be very accurate, the Constitution requires more.
Id. at 89, 447 N.E.2d at 503 (Simon, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (emphasis in
original).
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In People v. Smith,34 a deputy sheriff stopped the defendant's
truck because it had an expired safety-inspection sticker.', Smith
met the officer outside the vehicle and produced a driver's license.36
The officer smelled alcohol on defendant's breath, walked over to
the vehicle, and observed (from the outside) an open bottle in a
brown paper bag on the floor of the passenger compartment." He
also observed a small 3" by 5" wooden box lying on the floor on
the driver's side, underneath the steering wheel.38 He recognized it
as a "one-hitter box" which is often used to carry cannabis.3 9 The
officer then entered the vehicle on the passenger side and observed
a hypodermic syringe on the floor next to the box40 He placed a
cap on the bottle, opened the box, and discovered cannabis, cocaine, and a pipe.41 The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the search
under the automobile exception articulated in Ross. 42 The court
reasoned that the stop of the vehicle was lawful because the truck
lacked a valid safety-inspection sticker.43 The search was lawful
because the police had probable cause to search for alcohol after
seeing the open bottle and smelling the defendant's breath." The
officer had probable cause to seize and search the box for drugs
based on his experience with, and knowledge of, such containers
and his discovery of the syringe.45
In People v. Morales,"6 the police, acting on information from an
informant, placed the defendant under surveillance. 47 With the
assistance of binoculars, the officers observed the defendant converse with an individual and reach under the trunk of the car to get
something.48 He repeated this procedure five to seven times within
a forty-five minute period. The defendant then appeared to deliver
something to several individuals. 49 The police stopped and
searched the defendant and then looked under the rear bumper of
34.
35.
36.

95 II1. 2d 412, 447 N.E.2d 809 (1983).
Id. at 415, 447 N.E.2d at 810.
Id. at 415-16, 447 N.E.2d at 810.

37. Id.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 417, 447 N.E.2d at 812 (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)).
Smith, 95 Ill.
2d at 419, 447 N.E.2d at 812.
Id. at 419-20, 447 N.E.2d at 812.
Id.
109 Ill.
App. 3d 183, 440 N.E.2d 302 (1st Dist. 1982).
Id. at 184, 440 N.E.2d at 303.

48. Id.
49. Id. at 184-85, 440 N.E.2d at 303.
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the car and seized a jar which contained heroin. 50 The officer then
searched the rest of the car. The defendant was arrested and removed to the police station.5 The court upheld the search, reasoning that the police had probable cause
to believe that the car was
52
being used to transport contraband.
In People v. Sturlick, 3 a police officer stopped the defendant's
car as it was leaving the scene of a nighttime burglary.5 4 The initial
stop of the car was lawful because the car was missing a front license plate and had only one headlight. 55 The officer questioned
the defendant about a box that was located in the car.5 6 The defendant consented to the search of the box.57 The police officer
found in the box property which did not belong to the defendant.58
The officer also noticed screwdrivers underneath the front seat of
the car. 59 The seizure of the screwdrivers was justified under
Ross.60 The officer opened the trunk of the car and recovered more
stolen property. 61 The search of the trunk was upheld either because it was consensual or because the police had probable cause
from what they saw in the car's interior.62
IV. SEARCH OF AN AUTOMOBILE INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL
CUSTODIAL ARREST
When a police officer makes a lawful custodial arrest of a car's
driver or passenger, he may contemporaneously, incident to the
arrest, search the automobile. The search is limited to the area
within the immediate control of the arrestee. 63 In New York v. Belton,6 the Supreme Court held that the entire passenger compartment is included in this area. Therefore, a police officer may
search, incident to an arrest, the passenger compartment of the au50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 188, 440 N.E.2d at 305. The court found the result and rationale of Ross
dispositive of the issues under consideration. Id. at 186, 440 N.E.2d at 305.
53. 130 Ill. App. 3d 120, 474 N.E.2d 1 (2d Dist. 1985).
54. Id. at 122, 474 N.E.2d at 3.
55. Id. at 124, 474 N.E.2d at 5.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 126, 474 N.E.2d at 5-6.
61. Id. at 123, 474 N.E.2d at 3.
62. Id. at 126, 474 N.E.2d at 5-6.
63. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-64 (1969).
64. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
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tomobile and any open or closed container 65 found in the passenger

compartment.66 The automobile trunk, however, may not be
searched.67

The authority to search is derived from the lawfulness of the
arrest and its custodial nature. 68 No additional justification or independent probable cause to search is needed. Thus, police officers

have the authority to search for weapons and for fruits of the crime
for which the occupant lawfully was arrested.69 If, in pursuit of

these objectives, police officers come upon evidence of another
crime or contraband, that too may be seized.70 The search must be
conducted at the time and at the place of the arrest. It cannot be
postponed or removed to the police station.71

An officer may, of course, search a person who is under arrest.
An essential element of the search incident to arrest exception is
the presence of a lawful custodial arrest. 72 In assessing the ques-

tion of what is a custodial arrest, a judge may look to statutory
law, police department policy, or the personal decision of the officer to effectuate a custodial arrest. In the latter situation, the personal decision must have been formulated prior to the search.

Further, the officer's decision must be objectively reasonable.73
The Illinois appellate court cases follow the Belton approach. It

appears that the Illinois Supreme Court has not had occasion to
address Belton squarely. 74 For example, in People v. Worlow,75 a
65. In Belton, the Supreme Court defined a "container" as any object capable of holding an object, e.g., glove compartment, console, luggage, box, bag, or clothing. Belton,
453 U.S. at 460-61 n.4.
66. Id. at 460-61.
67. Id. at 460-61 n.4.
68. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (stating "[t]he scope of [a] search
must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation
permissible").
69. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 47-48 (1970).
70. See Belton, 453 U.S. 455-56, 462-63. In Belton, the defendant was stopped for
excessive speed. Id. at 455. The officers searched the defendant's car after smelling marijuana. The search resulted in the discovery of marijuana and of cocaine. Id. at 456. The
United States Supreme Court held that the seizure of the evidence of another crime was
valid. Id. at 462.
71. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 47 (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367

(1964)).
72. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (stating that the fact of
the lawful arrest established the authority to search but that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest, a full search is "not only an exception to the warrant requirement.. . , but is
also a 'reasonable' search under [the Fourth] Amendment"). See also Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 263-66 (1973).
73. See generally Robinson, 414 U.S. 218; Gustafson, 414 U.S. 260.
74. The Illinois Supreme Court, however, has recognized the authority of the police
to search an automobile incident to arrest. See People v. Bayles, 82 Ill. 2d 128, 411
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police officer stopped the defendant's car for running a red light. 6
The officer smelled an alcoholic odor emanating from the car.
When questioned, the defendant denied having alcohol in the car.
The officer, however, noticed liquid leaking from her purse. The
officer then touched the purse and felt the bulge of glass containers.
The defendant handed the officer two open beer bottles from her
purse. The officer searched the purse and found cannabis." The
search was upheld on three grounds. 78 First, the officer had probable cause to search the passenger compartment of the car. 79 Second, the officer reasonably searched her purse because it was
within the area over which she had access and control.80 Finally,
the search was conducted incident to a lawful custodial arrest.81
The court reasoned that a reasonable person in her situation would
have considered
herself arrested when the officer received the open
82
beer bottles.
In People v. Grigsby,8 3 the defendant was suspected of an armed
robbery.84 Police officers stopped the defendant's car because it
had no license plates. The officers arrested the defendant for failure to produce a driver's license, and for driving a vehicle with
neither license plates nor a vehicle sticker. The police officer
searched the defendant for weapons, put him in the patrol car, and
then searched his car. The officer found six hundred dollars in the
glove compartment.8 s The court concluded that 87the Belton decision controlled,8 6 and that the search was proper.
N.E.2d 1346 (1980). See also People v. Hoskins, 101 Ill. 2d 209, 217, 461 N.E.2d 941, 945
(1984) (in a search incident to an arrest, not involving an automobile, the Illinois

Supreme Court made reference to Belton, stating: "the court in Belton extended Robinson
by holding that all containers within the defendant's immediate control could also be
searched regardless of the likelihood that a weapon or evidence of criminal conduct
would be found.")
75. 106 Ill. App. 3d 112, 435 N.E.2d 795 (5th Dist. 1982).
76. Id. at 113, 435 N.E.2d at 796.

77. Id.
78. Id. at 115, 435 N.E.2d at 797.

79. Id.
80. Id. at 116, 435 N.E.2d at 797. The court cited to Belton in holding that the
lawful custodial arrest justified the infringement of any privacy interest the defendant
might have had. Id.
81. Id. (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 152 (1969)).
82. Worlow, 106 Ill App. 3d at 116, 435 N.E.2d at 798.
83. 111 111. App. 3d 38, 443 N.E.2d 746 (1st Dist. 1982).
84. Id. at 40, 443 N.E.2d at 748.
85. Id.
86. The court noted that the Belton Court specifically stated that a glove compartment was a container that may be searched. Id. at 43, 443 N.E,2d at 749-50 (citing New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.4).
87. Grigsby, 111 111. App. 3d at 42, 443 N.E.2d at 750.
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ADMINISTRATIVE CHECKPOINTS

Generally, a police officer cannot stop a motorist on the road
unless there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that he
or she is unlicensed or that the automobile is not registered. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held in Delaware v. Prouse88 that a
random stop to investigate license or registration status is unreasonable. On the other hand, an objectively reasonable traffic
checkpoint, such as a roadblock stopping all motorists, or some
motorists, pursuant to a prior specified plan (such as every tenth
vehicle) is permissible even without articulable suspicion.89
Illinois applies Prouse liberally. In People v. Franks,9° the police
set up a portable weigh station for trucks. 91 Every truck of a specified type and class that approached the station was weighed. 92 The
defendant was stopped and then ticketed for driving an overweight
truck. The court ruled that the stop was lawful and noted that the
Prouse decision never was intended to prohibit roadside truck
93
weigh stations.
In People v. Meitz,94 the police set up a "stakeout" at an apartment complex which was the site of recent auto thefts.95 The police officers had been instructed to stop every late moCe¢l General
Motors car leaving the complex between 9:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m.
on Thursdays and Sundays for two weeks.96 The police stopped
the defendant, a driver of a General Motors car, and then arrested
him for auto theft.9 7 The court found the stop to be lawful. 9s The
court applied Prouse and reasoned that stopping all cars of the
same type as those stolen was reasonable. 99
In People v. Lust,1°° the police established a "safety check" station for trucks. 10' They let some trucks pass without inspection in
order to avoid traffic congestion. 10 2 The defendant was stopped
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

440 U.S. 648 (1979).
Id. at 664 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
72 I11.App. 3d 940, 391 N.E.2d 574 (3d Dist. 1979).
Id. at 941, 391 N.E.2d at 575.
Id. at 942, 391 N.E.2d at 575.
Id. at 943, 391 N.E.2d at 576 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 n. 26).
95 II1.App. 3d 1033, 420 N.E.2d 1119 (2d Dist. 1981).
Id. at 1034, 420 N.E.2d at 1120.
Id.
Id. at 1035, 420 N.E.2d at 1121.
Id. at 1039, 420 N.E.2d at 1123-24.
Id.
119 I11.App. 3d 509, 456 N.E.2d 980 (4th Dist. 1983).
Id. at 510, 456 N.E.2d at 981.
Id. at 511, 456 N.E.2d at 981.
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and arrested for driving on a revoked license.10 3 The court found
the stop lawful.10 4 The court noted that the Prouse Court specifically provided that questioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock
type stops was a viable method of circumventing the intrusiveness
of indiscrete spot checks of autos. 0 5
In People v. Long, 1°6 the police set up a driver's license checkpoint. 07 The defendant stopped his car approximately one hundred yards before he would have reached the checkpoint.108 A
police officer approached the vehicle and administered a field sobriety test after detecting the odor of liquor on the defendant's
breath.1°9 The defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor ("DUI")."10 The court held the stop
was lawful under Prouse.I' The court noted, as did the Lust court,
that the Prouse court sought to prevent the unconstrained exercise
of discretion by police officers. 1 2 The driver's license checkpoint
at issue did not allow the113police such unconstrained discretion,
and, therefore, was lawful.
In People v. Bartley," 4 a temporary roadblock was set up to
check drivers' licenses and to identify DUI drivers during the holiday season." 5 Police officers stopped the defendant at the checkpoint and then arrested him for DUI."16 The Illinois Supreme
Court found the stop lawful."17 The court reasoned that a roadblock set up to identify those driving under the influence is lawful
because it serves a compelling state interest in reducing alcoholrelated highway accidents." 8 The court concluded that this interest outweighed minimal intrusion on motorists." 9
103.
104.
105.

(1979)).
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
663).
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id. at 512, 456 N.E.2d at 983.
Id. at 512, 456 N.E.2d at 982-83 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663

124 11. App. 3d 1030, 465
Id. at 1031, 465 N.E.2d at
Id. at 1032, 465 N.E.2d at
Id. at 1032, 465 N.E.2d at

N.E.2d 123 (3d Dist. 1984).
124.
124.
125.

Id.
Id. at 1034, 465 N.E.2d at 126.
Id. at 1034, 465 N.E.2d at 125-26 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
Long, 124 IlL. App. 3d at 1034, 465 N.E.2d at 126.
109 I1. 2d 273, 486 N.E.2d 880 (1985).
Id. at 278, 486 N.E.2d at 881-82.
Id. at 279, 486 N.E.2d at 883.
Id. at 292, 486 N.E.2d at 889.
Id.
Id. at 292-93, 486 N.E.2d at 889.
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INVENTORY SEARCHES

Under the Supreme Court's decision in South Dakota v. Opperman, a lawfully seized car may be searched without a search warrant, without probable cause, or without articulable suspicion if it
is inspected routinely to secure and inventory its contents. 120 The
authority to search typically is derived from police department policy."' Random searches are not permitted,' 22 The search power
extends to closed containers found in the vehicle itself.' 23 An open
question is whether the inventory rationale applies to the search of
the auto trunk.
24
Illinois courts apply Opperman liberally. In People v. Clark,
the defendant's car stalled on the street. 21 When police officers
arrived to assist, the defendant failed to produce a driver's license. 126 One of the police officers observed open beer cans in the
car. The defendant was arrested for illegally transporting alcoholic
liquor. An inventory search of the vehicle produced stolen
checks. 27 The search was upheld under Opperman, because it was
the policy of the police department to remove, secure, and inventory articles of value in a car that was about to be towed and
12
impounded.
In People v. Dennison,129 police officers placed the defendant into
custody for suspected auto theft. 30 The officers discovered some
car parts in his yard, arrested the defendant and impounded his
vehicle.' 3' At the police station, the officers searched his station
wagon. 32 They found a tool box, examined its contents, and discovered papers which bore the name of the owner of the stolen
parts. 33 The court held that the seizure of the box was proper but
that the search of its interior was not. 34 The court reasoned that
120. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372-76 (1976).
121. The Opperman Court noted that the question of the authority to search was
entirely different from the question of the reasonableness of that search. Id. at 372 (quoting Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61 (1967)).
122. Id. at 372.
123. Colorado v. Bertine, 107 S. Ct. 738 (1987).
124. 65 Ill. 2d 169, 357 N.E.2d 798 (1976).
125. Id. at 171, 357 N.E.2d at 799.
126. Id. at 172, 357 N.E.2d at 799.

127. Id.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 174, 357 N.E.2d at 800-01.
61 Ill. App. 3d 473, 378 N.E.2d 220 (5th Dist. 1978).
Id. at 475, 378 N.E.2d at 222.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 477, 378 N.E.2d at 223.
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the inventory rationale of Opperman did not extend to a search of a
closed container.1 35 The 1validity
of this decision must be ques36
tioned in light of Bertine.
In People v. Hardy,1 37 the defendant was arrested in a car which
had stolen license plates on it. 138 The police conducted an inventory search before towing the vehicle. During the inventory
search, a police officer looked under the hood to see if the battery
was there.1 39 He discovered a bottle that contained thirty grams of
heroin. 4° The court held that the search was valid under Opper4
man because it was conducted pursuant to police procedure.' '
In People v. Von Hatten, 42 the police officers arrested the defendant in his hotel room and had his car towed in accordance
with the wishes of the hotel manager. 43 The police conducted an
inventory search that produced cannabis and stolen property.'"
The court held that the search was unlawful because the car was
parked lawfully at the hotel. 45 The court reasoned that because
the police could not take custody of the car, an inventory was
improper.'"
In People v. Bayles, 47 the defendant was involved in a serious
auto accident that caused his car to flip upside-down. 48 Several
items were thrown from the car when it flipped, including a suitcase and a cloth drawstring sack. 4 9 The defendant requested that
the suitcase be guarded because it contained something very valuable, and the police officers were informed of his request. 50 The
135. Id. at 478-79, 378 N.E.2d at 224.
136. See Comment, Colorado v. Bertine: An Expansion of the Vehicle Inventory Doctrine as Applied to Vehicles and the Impact on Illinois Law, 19 LoY. U. CH1. L.J. 1101
(1988) (stating that under the United State Supreme Court's analysis in Bertine, inventory searches of the contents of closed containers found in an impounded vehicle are
reasonable under the fourth amendment if conducted pursuant to standard procedures).
137. 77 I1. App. 3d 37, 395 N.E.2d 743 (3d Dist. 1979).
138. Id. at 39, 395 N.E.2d at 744.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 39, 395 N.E.2d at 745 (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364
(1976)).
142. 52 II1.App. 3d 338, 367 N.E.2d 556 (4th Dist. 1977).
143. Id. at 340, 367 N.E.2d at 558.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 342, 367 N.E.2d at 559. The court also noted that there were no exigent
circumstances that would have warranted the car being searched. Id.
146. Id. See also People v. Valdez, 81 11. App. 3d 25, 400 N.E.2d 1096 (2d Dist.
1980).
147. 82 Ill.
2d 128, 411 N.E.2d 1346 (1980).
148. Id. at 131, 411 N.E.2d at 1347.
149. Id. at 132, 411 N.E.2d at 1347.
150. Id.at 132-33, 411 N.E.2d at 1347.
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officers opened the sack and found cannabis.1 5 ' They additionally
opened a shaving kit, which they had seen inside the car, and
found $1,255 in cash.1 2 Finally, they opened the suitcase and discovered a brick of marijuana.5 3 The Illinois Supreme Court found

the search of the suitcase was improper. 54 The court concluded
that inventorying contents of a suitcase found in a lawfully impounded vehicle, in the absence of exigent circumstances, was
unreasonable.I55
In People v. Braasch,'56 a state trooper stopped the defendant for
his failure to use a turn signal, and then arrested him for driving
under the influence. 157 The officer placed the defendant in the
squad car and then conducted an inventory search of the car's interior and trunk.'
In the trunk, the officer found a closed brown
paper bag which contained cannabis. 159 The appellate court found
the search of the trunk and the bag proper under Opperman.'60
The court reasoned that because an inventory search may be conducted of a closed container found in possession of a person,' 6' it
may also be conducted on an automobile containing a closed
62
container.

VII. INVESTIGATIVE STOPS AND

SEARCHES BASED ON

ARTICULABLE SUSPICION

The United States Supreme Court has held that a brief investigative stop of a vehicle based on articulable suspicion of criminality,
which is objectively reasonable, is permissible. 63 And, articulable
suspicion may be established by the personal observation and experience of a police officer;' 64 information obtained from a victim,
witness, or an informant which is corroborated by independent po151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 132, 411 N.E.2d at 1348.
Id. at 133, 411 N.E.2d at 1348.
Id.
Id. at 141, 411 N.E.2d at 1352.
Id. But see Bertine, supra note 136.
122 Il1.App. 3d 747, 461 N.E.2d 651 (2d Dist. 1984).
Id. at 749, 461 N.E.2d at 653.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 756, 461 N.E.2d at 655.
Id. at 755, 461 N.E.2d at 657. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1982)

(holding that it was not unreasonable for police to search a container in accordance with
established inventory procedures upon incarcerating an arrested person at the station
house).
162. Braasch, 122 I1. App. 3d at 755, 461 N.E.2d at 657.
163. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
164. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1983).

1058

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 19

lice investigation; 65 or
information supplied by another police of66
department.
or
ficer
During such an investigatory stop, a police officer may order the
occupant out of the car. 67 Further, if the officer is objectively reasonable in fearing for his own safety or for the safety of another, he
or she may frisk the occupant for weapons.' 6 The officer may
question the detainee briefly to learn his or her identity and purpose and demand a driver's license and registration in order to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion.' 69 The officer may also engage
in a limited search of the interior passenger compartment of the
automobile for weapons if he or she has an objectiveiy reasonable
belief that the suspect is dangerous and that the suspect may gain
immediate control of a weapon.170 Of course, contraband or evidence of other criminality in plain view may be seized during the
"limited" search for weapons. The limited search rule also applies
7
to a non-custodial arrest of the car's occupant.' '
In People v. Brand, 72 the police observed the defendant driving
twenty miles per hour in a forty-five miles per hour zone. The
defendant was stopped and subsequently was arrested for driving
with a suspended license. 7 3 The court held that the stop was improper because the police officer lacked articulable suspicion. 74
The State failed to demonstrate that the defendant's manner of
driving was hazardous to other motorists, or in any other way provided the officers with an articulable circumstance warranting the
75
stopping of his vehicle.
In People v. Jackson,176 police received information that a ring of
car thieves was using a tow truck and observation car equipped
with a citizens band radio to steal cars.' 77 Officers later observed
the defendant driving a tow truck with a car in tow, followed by a
165. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
166. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
167. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
168. Adams, 407 U.S. 143.
169. Long, 463 U.S. at 1034.

170. Id.
171. Id. The Court stressed that this type of "close range" police investigation can
put officers in an extremely vulnerable position in which a search is the only way to insure
their safety. Id.
172. 71 I1. App. 3d 698, 390 N.E.2d 65 (1st Dist. 1979).
173. Id. at 699, 390, N.E.2d at 66-67.
174. Id. at 700, 390 N.E.2d at 67.
175. Id. at 700-01, 390 N.E.2d at 68.
176. 77 11. App. 3d 117, 395 N.E.2d 976 (1st Dist. 1979).
177. Id. at 119, 395 N.E.2d at 978.
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car with a CB antenna. 7 The defendant was stopped by the police. 79 The court held that the stop was reasonable and lawful
based on articulable suspicion. 180
In People v. Deppert,'8 police officers noticed a car traveling five
to ten miles per hour in a thirty-five miles per hour zone at approximately 4:00 a.m. 182 It appeared to the officers that the driver was
unfamiliar with the area.183 The defendant turned around in a railroad yard which was private property and was stopped by police. 184 The court found the stop was unlawful reasoning that the
officers had no reasonable or articulable
suspicion that the defend18 5
ant was engaged in criminal activity.
In People v. Jackiewicz,I 6 the police observed the defendant's car
leaving from the rear entrance of a business that had been victimized by recent thefts and vandalism. 8 7 The business was not open
at the time. 88 The officers noticed that the defendant and his passenger appeared "jittery."' 189 The police stopped the defendant's
car. The court upheld the stop based on articulated suspicion. 19°
In People v. Kunath, 19 police observed a car "slid[e] through" a
stop sign. 192 Later, the police observed the same car driving the
wrong way down an unmarked apartment driveway. When the officer eventually approached the car, he saw the passenger reach
underneath the car seat. The ensuing search of the automobile revealed various items of contraband. 93 At trial, the police con178. Id. at 120, 395 N.E.2d at 978.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 122-23, 395 N.E.2d at 980. The record reflected that the officer received
information regarding a particular operation and that the information was corroborated
by the facts. Taken together, the circumstances warranted the stop and subsequent investigation. Id.
181. 83 Ill. App. 3d 375, 403 N.E.2d 1279 (3d Dist. 1980).
182. Id. at 377, 403 N.E.2d at 1280.
183. Id. at 378, 403 N.E.2d at 1281.
184. Id. The defendant subsequently was searched and was arrested for unlawful use
of weapons after the officer found a gun and ammunition on the floorboard of the car. Id.
185. Id. at 381-82, 403 N.E.2d at 1283.
186. 96 Ill. App. 3d 222, 421 N.E.2d 385 (4th Dist. 1981).
187. Id. at 222-23, 421 N.E.2d at 386.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 223, 421 N.E.2d at 386.
190. Id. at 224, 421 N.E.2d at 386-87. The court noted the similarity of this case to
the Deppert case. The court was able, however, to distinguish the Deppert case because
here, the likelihood that the defendant's car had been hidden on private property late at
night and long enough for a theft to have occurred formed the basis for reasonable suspicion of criminality. Id.
191. 99 I11.App. 3d 201, 425 N.E.2d 486 (2d Dist. 1981).
192. Id. at 202, 425 N.E.2d at 487.
193. Id.
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ceded that no violation of the law had occurred, nonetheless they
had stopped the defendant. 94 The appellate court found the stop
unlawful because it entailed an impermissible infringement of the
passenger's personal freedom.195 The court held that196the officers
acted without probable cause in stopping the vehicle.
In People v. Garman, 97 two young girls waived down the police
because a man in a car startled them by screaming at them. 98 The
girls indicated they could not understand what the man said. 99
The girls then identified defendant's car and the defendant himself.2°° An officer stopped the defendant, questioned him, and then
arrested him for driving under the influence. 20 ' The appellate
court concluded that the stop was unlawful, because the police
could not have developed articulable suspicion from the information obtained.20 2
In People v. Houldridge, °3 a police officer observed the defendant driving erratically. 204 The officer stopped the defendant after a
license plate check revealed that the vehicle registration had expired.205 The officer approached the car, smelled burned cannabis,
and then observed some furtive movements by the passengers of
the car. The officer then ordered the defendant and the passengers
to place their hands on the dashboard. The officer shone a flashlight into the car, saw a plastic bag containing what appeared to be
cannabis, seized the cannabis, and arrested the defendant.2 6 The
court found the search proper because the officer had probable
cause to search the car.20 7 Additionally, the furtive movements of
194. Id. at 203, 425 N.E.2d at 487.
195. Id. at 205, 425 N.E.2d at 489. See also People v. Grotti, 112 Ill. App. 3d 718,
445 N.E.2d 946 (5th Dist. 1983).
196. Kunath, 99 Ill. App. 3d at 205, 425 N.E.2d at 490.
197. 123 11. App. 3d 682, 463 N.E.2d 158 (3d Dist. 1984).
198. Id. at 683, 463 N.E.2d at 159.

199. Id.
200. Id.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 683-84, 463 N.E.2d at 159.
Id. at 685, 463 N.E.2d at 160.
117 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 454 N.E.2d 769 (4th Dist. 1983).
Id. at 1061, 454 N.E.2d at 770.
Id. at 1061, 454 N.E.2d at 771.

206. Id.
207. Id. at 1064, 454 N.E.2d at 771-72. The court noted that the weaving of the car
coupled with the information that the registration had expired provided an adequate basis
for an investigatory stop of the auto. Id. The court also indicated that the burning odor of
the marijuana could provide an officer with probable cause to believe a crime was being

committed, and therefore, could serve as another basis for a warrantless search under
Ros& Id. (citing Ross, 456 U.S. 798).
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the passengers provided further justification for the search.2 °8 The
officer reasonably could have feared that the defendant or a passenger might gain access to weapons.2
In People v. Johnson,21° the court applied Michigan v. Long to
justify a limited search.21' In Johnson, a murder took place at a
rest stop along an interstate highway. 2 A dispatch over the state
police emergency network described a suspect vehicle as a silver,
newer model car, with license XF 7184.213 The police stopped defendant's car, a 1980 silver Chevy Malibu, licensc QV 7834, forty
miles northwest, for driving with only one headlight. 214 The defendant left the car and exclaimed that he was lost. 215 An officer
searched the passenger compartment of the car.21 6 The court held
that the limited search of the vehicle and its occupants was reasonable because the officer believed he was dealing with a criminal, not
just an ordinary traffic offender.21 7
VIII.

CONSENT

Consent is the ultimate authority to search without a search
warrant, without probable cause, or without articulable suspicion.
218
Consent must be given by one who has sole authority to consent,
or by a person who shares the authority with another. 2 9 The consent must be voluntary.220 Voluntariness is determined under the
"totality of the circumstances" test.221
In People v. Corral,222 a police officer stopped the defendant's
truck for speeding.223 The defendant failed to produce a logbook,
bill of lading, letter of authorization for his passenger, or a medical
208. Id. (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983)).
209. Houldridge, 117 Ill. App. 3d at 1064, 454 N.E.2d at 773.
210. 123 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 463 N.E.2d 877 (4th Dist. 1984).
211. Id. at 1012, 463 N.E.2d at 881 (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983)).
212. Johnson, 123 Ill. App. 3d at 1010, 463 N.E.2d at 879.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 1010, 463 N.E.2d at 880.
216. Id. at 1011, 463 N.E.2d at 880.
217. Id. at 1012, 463 N.E.2d at 881.

218. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
219. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974). The shared authority rests on
mutual use of the property (car or effects within it) by persons who generally have joint
access or control for most purposes. Id. at 169-70 n.4.

220. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
221. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
222. 147 Ill. App. 3d 668, 498 N.E.2d 287 (4th Dist. 1986).
223. Id. at 669, 498 N.E.2d at 288.
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card. 224 As a result he was required to rest for eight hours before
he could continue his driving. At the suppression hearing, the officer testified that he and his partner were acting upon a telephone
call from the Illinois Department of Criminal Investigation ("the
IDCI") which informed them of the description of the defendant's
truck and of the possibility that it was transporting a quantity of
drugs. At the police station, a police officer learned that this
truck's cargo was chili peppers. Acting on instructions from the
IDCI, the officer then told the defendant that the Department of
Agriculture would probably want to check his cargo. The defendant signed a consent to search form, and the police meticulously
searched the entire vehicle, including the defendant's suitcases. 225
The officers found cannabis and a quantity226of heroin in the suitcases and on the truck's interior structure.
The trial court's order to suppress was affirmed on appeal.227
The appellate court affirmed the suppression, reasoning that the
defendant's consent to search was limited to his cargo. 228 This limited consent did not allow the police to search suitcases located
within the vehicle or to search the interior structure of the vehicle. 229 The court noted that the information the officers received
regarding the truck carrying drugs was too attenuated to provide
probable cause to search. 230 The officers knew only that the de23
fendant's vehicle was proceeding in excess of the speed limit. '
The defendant in People v. Whitfield 232 was a prison guard at the
Menard Correctional Center in Chester.233 As the defendant entered work one morning, he was stopped and searched.23 4 The
search produced cigarette packs which contained cannabis, cocaine, and heroin. 23 5 A deputy sheriff then arrested the defend224. Id. at 670, 498 N.E.2d at 289.

225. Id.
226. Id. at 670-71, 498 N.E.2d at 289.
227. Id. at 675, 498 N.E.2d at 291.
228. Id. at 674, 498 N.E.2d at 291-92. The court focused on the officer's reference to

an agricultural inspection which was in reality a mere ruse to permit a full scale search of
the vehicle. Under these circumstances the trial court was correct in concluding that the

defendant had consented only to an inspection of his cargo by the Department of Agriculture. Id.
229. Id.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id. at 673, 498 N.E.2d at 291.
Id.
140 Ill. App. 3d 433, 488 N.E.2d 1087 (5th Dist. 1986).
Id. at 436, 488 N.E.2d at 1089.
Id.
Id.
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ant.236 The defendant's car was parked outside the Center and
subsequently was searched.237 As a condition of employment, the
defendant had previously signed a waiver and consent form to
search his car.238 Further, the defendant gave the officers verbal
permission to search the vehicle. 239 The search of the car produced
more drugs contained in cigarette packages. 24 0 The court found
the search proper. 24 ' The court concluded that the authorities did
not exceed the scope of the consent because, upon taking the job,
the defendant had been advised that his car would be subject to
searches on the prison grounds, and additionally because the defendant verbally consented to the search at the time of his arrest.242
IX.

STANDING -

EXCLUSIONARY RULE

Although the fourth amendment protects a citizen against an
unreasonable search or seizure, the suppression remedy is not automatic. A defendant must have standing to seek suppression of evidence.243 Courts measure standing by the "legitimate expectation
of privacy" test.2 " Under this test, the defendant must establish
that he had exhibited an actual expectation of privacy (a subjective
prong) and that his expectation was reasonable, i.e., that this is the
type of privacy expectation which society wishes to protect (an objective prong). 245 To validate the objective prong, the defendant
must allege and establish a property interest in either the automobile or the property seized from the automobile. This requirement
is essential to contesting a vehicle search.21
In People v. Johnson,247 the defendant was charged with rape and
murder. 24 The police had learned that the vehicle which was used
236. Id.
237. Id. at 436-37, 488 N.E.2d at 1090.
238. Id. at 440, 488 N.E.2d at 1091.
239. Id. at 440, 488 N.E.2d at 1090.
240. Id. at 437, 488 N.E.2d at 1090.
241. Id. at 440, 488 N.E.2d at 1091.
242. Id.
243. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). The Court held that a defendant
charged with crimes of possession may only claim the benefits of the exclusionary rule if
his own fourth amendment rights have been violated. Id. at 95. See also Brown v. United
States, 411 U.S. 730 (1973); Alderman v. United States 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969) (other
rejections of attempts to vicariously assert the violations of fourth amendment rights of
others as grounds for standing.).
244. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
245. 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). See also People v. Flowers, III Ill. App. 3d 348, 352,
444 N.E.2d 242, 24647 (2d Dist. 1982).
246. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143-44 n.12.
247. 114 11. 2d 170, 499 N.E.2d 1355 (1986).
248. Id. at 179, 499 N.E.2d at 1358.
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to commit the crimes belonged to the defendant's stepfather.249
They
obtained consent from the defendant's stepfather to search
it. 250 The defendant sought to suppress various items seized from
the vehicle.25 ' The trial court denied the motion to suppress.252
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the defendant did
not have standing to contest the search.253 The court utilized the
rationale articulated in the United States Supreme Court case
Rakas v. Illinois 214 to analyze whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 255 Thus, the court analyzed whether
the defendant was legitimately in the area searched; whether the
defendant had a possessory interest in the area searched or in the
property seized; and, whether the defendant had the right to exclude others from using the property.256 The court found that the
defendant drove the truck six months prior to the search; that
there was no continuous use or right of access; that he was not in
possession of the truck or in the area when it was searched; that he
failed to claim any property interest in the truck; and that he
stored no personal items in the truck.2 " Therefore, the court concluded the defendant lacked standing to contest the search. 258
In People v. Neal,259 a state trooper was suspected of issuing false
traffic citations for the Illinois State Police.2w Investigators
searched his patrol car and discovered twelve to thirteen unofficial
citations in his raincoat pouch which was found in the automobile. 26 The court held that the defendant did not have standing to
contest the search.262 Although he had a subjective expectation of
privacy concerning the patrol car, that expectation was objectively
unreasonable because the car and the raincoat were state owned.
The court noted that the items were subject to periodic inspection
by superiors with or without notice, and that the defendant was
aware that his superiors could inspect his car in his presence or out
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id. at 184, 499 N.E.2d at 1361.
Id. at 187, 499 N.E.2d at 1362.
Id. at 191, 499 N.E.2d at 1364.
Id.
Id. at 193, 499 N.E.2d at 1364.
439 U.S. 128.
Johnson, 114 IM.2d at 191, 499 N.E.2d at 1364.
Id. at 191-92, 499 N.E.2d at 1364.
Id. at 192, 499 N.E.2d at 1364-65.
Id. at 193, 499 N.E.2d at 1365.
109 IM.2d 216, 486 N.E.2d 898 (1985).
Id. at 218, 486 N.E.2d at 900.
Id. at 219, 486 N.E.2d at 900.
Id. at 222, 486 N.E.2d at 900-01.
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of his presence.263 Thus, the defendant failed the objective prong
of the standing test.
X.

CONCLUSION

In the real world of police work, it is difficult to delineate a
search within a particular legal justification. Most situations implicate a number of exceptions to the search warrant requirement.
Illinois cases seem to blend these distinct theories of justification.
What matters to Illinois courts is whether the police conduct was
reasonable under the fourth amendment. When faced with automobile search issues, Illinois courts generally adhere to the interpretation of the fourth amendment as expressed by the United
States Supreme Court. 26

263. Id.
264. See, e.g., People v. Tisler, 103 Il. 2d 226, 469 N.E.2d 147 (1984).

